The Role of Power in Negotiation

Surefire Negotiation Tactics

Surefire Negotiation Tactics

Shockingly Simple But Powerful Negotiation Strategies Save The Ordinary Joe Thousands Of Dollars Of Foreseen Expenses. Discover How You Too Can Save More, Keep Under Your Budget, And Make More Money With These Simple Negotiation Tactics You Can Apply In Any Business!

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20 Negotiation Tactics

This 70 minute video gives you access to a whole new world of negotiation techniques that you probably have never thought of before. You will learn the psychology of how people make choices, and how you can leverage those choices into your advantage in a negotiation setting. All of these tips were chosen because of how widely they can be applied to all kinds of situations. You will also get 50 real-life examples to use in your own negotiations, so that you can learn to never be taken advantage of. All we need is 70 minutes of your time, and we can have you negotiating like a pro, to be able to have people see your way, no matter what you're proposing. All of these tactics can be applied in many different settings, such as asking for a raise, getting a job, or even winning an argument! All these tactics can change how people view you, and give yourself authority!

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Unresolved Issues in Climate Change Negotiations

Based on experience in the rapidly changing, highly competitive world of business, the private sector generally would like to see the negotiators take a practical, flexible approach to resolving the remaining open issues in the Kyoto Protocol. This means that it is important to set rules that encourage, rather than penalize, behaviors and projects that can lead to reduced GHG emissions. It is as the focus is on penalizing failure rather than rewarding success, there will be resistance to any agreement by many of the participants in the negotiations. At least part of the problem in achieving agreement on practical, flexible ways to meet the overarching goals of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) can be traced to the fact that issues unrelated to the climate cloud the negotiating process. Issues that were not explicitly on the table in the climate negotiations but were important in formulating national positions include trade and tariff relationships, protectionism,...

Hie Ozone Depletion Negotiations and Universal Participation

Universal participation was a normative position internalized before the climate change negotiations began. Positive reinforcement of the universal participation rule after the London Amendment negotiations led to its use in the next global environmental problem to arise there was a stable, low complexity social context as all states understood that the appropriate rule to follow was the universal participation norm. The experience of the ozone depletion negotiations and the rule model alterations that the United States underwent because of them shaped U.S. climate change activities. This is in line with the expectations of the NLC CAS framework and the model. This final link warrants further attention. It is likely impossible to show a definitive link between ozone depletion and climate change (ruling out all other possibilities for the source of the U.S. commitment to universal participation), and the context of climate change did not solely consist of the ozone depletion...

The organization of global negotiations

The focus of this book is on the organization of global negotiations, and how organizational factors can help (or not) to overcome the challenges faced by global negotiations. Before proceeding further, we need to pin down exactly what is meant by 'organization' in this context. Organizing a global negotiation involves managing a range of organizational elements. Organizational elements that tend to be of particular importance to global negotiations, and which are covered in this book, are as follows The timing of the negotiations The founding treaty of the regime will itself establish a set of institutions within which subsequent negotiations take place, usually a Conference or Meeting of the Parties, with one or two subsidiary bodies. The founding treaty may also include a limited set of procedural rules, such as voting majorities for decisionmaking in specific circumstances, or basic rules for admitting NGOs. These are very stable organizational elements, which, inscribed as they...

Access to negotiations and delegations

While NGOs have been formally accredited as observers to the climate change negotiations since the talks began in 1991, participation in the negotiations have in practice taken the following forms access to the conference venue, presence during meetings, interventions during debate, the face-to-face lobbying of delegations, and the distribution of documents (Oberth r et al, 2002). Somewhat paradoxically, most of the final negotiations of the compliance procedure, where most delegates agreed on the need for transparency, were conducted behind closed doors (see also Chapter 1 by Werksman). Although participation does not equal influence, it has certainly been a drawback for the green NGOs to have been shut out from important forums. NGOs have therefore had to rely on traditional 'corridor politics' involving face-to-face lobbying and the distribution of documents in the lobby between sessions.7 There are ways, however, to overcome the problem of lacking access. For example, there has...

Overview The Ozone Depletion Negotiations Of

Most analyses of the ozone negotiations have been critically concerned with cooperation and effectiveness.1 These studies examine the interests, power, and behavior of the major actors (both sovereignty free and sovereignty bound),2 assess the impact of scientific knowledge, and investigate the structure of the negotiations themselves searching for the factor(s) that led to successful cooperation and or effectiveness. In contrast, the main thrust of this book explains the conditions for cooperation the foundations for the governance of both ozone depletion and climate change. I am thus more concerned with exploring how certain fundamental ideas about participation arose and were internalized in the United States than I am with the substantive issues of addressing ozone depletion or cooperation. I explore how the underlying intersubjective understanding of the problems evolved. Therefore, I focus on two connected stories about participation in the ozone depletion negotiations the...

The Buenos Aires Workplan and Subsequent Negotiations

The unremarkable result of the Buenos Aires negotiations was a 2-year workplan intended to guide the development of protocol implementation rules, such as how the flexibility mechanisms and the GHG emission accounting systems will work. Despite the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the United States signed the protocol during the COP-4. And although Argentina and Kazakhstan indicated their intentions to adopt emission targets, some members of Congress viewed the administration's decision to sign the protocol before securing binding commitments from critical developing countries, notably China and India, as an affront to the Senate. For its part, the Clinton administration hoped that by demonstrating American commitment to the process, signing the treaty would enhance the United States' credibility and leverage in the COP-4 negotiations. Subsequent high-level negotiations in Bonn, Germany (COP-5), and The Hague, Netherlands (COP-6), failed to produce agreement on the Buenos Aires workplan. After...

Negotiations within Latin American Countries

In the past, some negotiated decision-making existed within Latin America's traditional, centralized decision-making framework. The interests represented within these negotiations were commonly limited to a select group, and they functioned within the prominent system of corporatism that has existed in the governments of Latin America for many years. Furthermore, the traditional negotiation style within Latin America is associated with nonverbal, informal, high-context communication, stressing long-term relationships among the parties involved and preoccupation with status and saving face 4-7 . Within Latin America, this style of negotiated decision-making, relying on informal relations and politico-technical methods rather than truly inclusive negotiations, has been institutionalized due to traditional political actors' practice of imposing their will and the absence of widespread political participation by the public 4 . Although many of these characteristics of governance still...

Englishonly negotiations

The conduct of negotiations in informal arenas in English only inevitably places non-Anglophone nations at a disadvantage, especially less well-resourced delegations that do not comprise individuals with language training. The greater spontaneity and quicker pace of informal negotiations redoubles this disadvantage. As Kaufmann explains, 'while the language advantage or Informal groups have sometimes been provided with interpretation on an exceptional basis. A case of this occurred at COP 6 (part II), where, at the request of a small number of developing countries, a limited number of interpretation slots was provided for the negotiating groups. These slots were taken up especially by the negotiating group on finance, an issue of particular concern to developing countries, illustrating the fact that developing countries are especially affected by the absence of interpretation. Interestingly, however, some negotiating group Chairs, notably the negotiating group on compliance, declined...

Unofficial negotiations

In addition to the groups discussed above, which operate within the ambit of the official negotiation process, it is common for parties to engage spontaneously in unofficial talks behind the scenes, to bargain and forge deals on issues of particular importance to them. Such unofficial negotiations function wholly outside the process, closed to all but the participants themselves, except for the important fact that any results emanating from them may eventually be brought to the plenary or other official forum to be adopted. Each negotiating session has its own share of unofficial negotiations in the corridors, where individuals exchange ideas and float alternatives on a no-obligation basis, over dinner or a cup of coffee, in the corridors while waiting for an official meeting to start, in the cafeteria queue, or in a privately booked meeting room. Such unofficial exchanges are crucial as lubricants to the official negotiations. They allow delegates to talk completely freely, as...

Mexican Environmental Negotiations Lessons from the Gray Whale Controversy

The gray whale controversy reveals that more diverse interests are making their voices heard within environmental negotiations and the decision-making process in Mexico. Although these are not formal negotiations as conceptualized within developed, democratic nations, this informal bargaining on the part of non-traditional actors has opened the door to greater transparency and public participation within Mexico's environmental decision-making. Additionally, as governmental agencies expand their powers and as non-traditional actors take advantage of opportunities within the press and legal systems, more voices will be included in environmental negotiations, possibly leading to a more formally inclusive negotiation process in the future. Within Mexico, a continuing transition to greater democracy, and thus more transparency and public participation, insures a changing constellation of actors as new groups and organizations come onto the scene. Increasing levels of interaction among...

MOU Negotiations Fail

Following two years of negotiation, attempts to craft an MOU were terminated by the Okanogan Board of County Commissioners in December of 2000. As a result, many water consumers in the area were left with potential take liability resulting from inadequate flows caused by their water diversions. The negotiations associated with the MOU had been contentious from the outset many local citizens advocated adopting a position of refusing to negotiate with the Feds, based on a belief that the ESA represents an unwarranted federal intrusion upon individual and state rights. Accordingly, litigation, rather than serious negotiation, became the course of action taken on ESA issues 27 .

Conflict resolution negotiations and the gains from trade in water permits

By using the WAS model to value water in dispute, water disputes can be monetized, and this may be of some assistance in resolving them. Consider bilateral negotiations between two countries, A and B. Each of the two countries can use its WAS tool to investigate the consequences to it (and, if data permit, to the other) of each proposed water allocation. This should help in deciding on what terms to settle, possibly trading off water for other, non-water concessions. Indeed, if, at a particular proposed allocation, A would value additional water more highly than B, then both countries could benefit by having A get more water and B getting other things that it values more. (Note that this does not mean that the richer country gets more water. That only happens if it is to the poorer country's benefit to agree.)15 In addition to monetizing water disputes, WAS can facilitate water negotiations by permitting each party, using its own WAS model, to evaluate the effects on it of different...

Political landscape of the negotiations

One of the most significant political developments outside the climate change negotiations was the election to the presidency of the US, immediately following COP-6, part 1, of George W. Bush. A few months before COP-6, part 2, President Bush announced that his administration viewed the Kyoto Protocol as being 'fatally flawed in fundamental ways' and expressed its 'unwillingness to embrace' the treaty.15 The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol added momentum to the Bonn negotiations, particularly in areas where the US views had represented a stubborn and powerful minority. Some delegations were also likely driven by a desire to show the US that the international community was capable of finishing its work and of demonstrating its continued support for the Protocol without US involvement. However, the withdrawal of the US from the negotiations did not have a major impact on the outcome of the compliance system. As will be seen, since Kyoto the US had consistently supported a strong...

The organization of the climate change negotiations

Considering and adopting proposed amendments, new annexes and protocols to the Convention, and also for holding sessions of the COP, including the admission of observers. In its Article 18, the Convention sets out the fundamental rules for participation in the climate change negotiations, that is, on a one-party-one-vote basis. The procedural rules included in the Convention are similar to those in other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),13 and are also carried over, mutatis mutandis, to the Kyoto Protocol. regime's procedural rules, and improvise based on those rules, in order to respond to the needs of the negotiation process and organize it better. The informal practices of the climate change negotiations are sometimes difficult to pin down, precisely because they are unwritten. They include, for example, the 'no more than two meetings' rule, whereby only two official negotiating groups may meet at any one time, along with the practice of appointing two Co-Chairs to...

Scientific input in the negotiations about a framework convention

The report was discussed at the UN in December and it was decided that an Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee (INC) be formed. The INC was given the task of preparing for the submission of a proposal for a framework convention on climate change (FCCC) to the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), scheduled for Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.16 This meant that only 18 months were allowed for the completion of this by no means simple task. Others of those that had previously been delegates to the IPCC now represented their countries during these political negotiations. Further, it was recognised early that the work of the INC should be based on the IPCC assessments and it was decided to issue a standing invitation to the IPCC chairman to represent the IPCC at INC sessions. In fact, I attended all but one of the eleven meetings that the INC held before the FCCC came into force in 1994. This, I felt, was most important in order to keep the INC delegates well informed...

Cooperation with the Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee

It was already becoming clear at that time that the Climate Convention might come into force earlier than expected. Altogether 166 countries had by then signed it and 29 ratifications had been recorded at the time of the meeting. Fifty ratifications were required for the Convention to come into force and this was achieved in March 1994. The first conference of the parties should then take place within a year. The second IPCC assessment might therefore not be ready in time for the first conference of the parties and it became very important that the special report was completed in 1994. Discussions and negotiations in the INC of course continued in the meantime with priority given to defining more precisely possible agreements on implementation of the Convention, Article 21.2 specifying that The exchange of letters between me and the INC chairman concerned whether the pace of the international negotiations was to be determined by the strict procedure needed for the acceptance of...

The importance of trustworthy scientific knowledge in climate negotiations

The analysis has shown that a penetrating examination of the facts is an absolute necessity when trying to understand and deal with the major societal and political issues that confront us when we try to resolve the global climate change issue. The analyses must be accepted as trustworthy by the international scientific community and should therefore be carried out as far as possible as an independent and open scientific endeavour. The IPCC reports have been produced in a manner aimed at securing this status. They have largely been free from influence by politicians and stakeholders of different kinds. Nevertheless, government representatives have attended the final plenary sessions, when the summaries for policy makers were finally agreed and the extracts of the key scientific conclusions formulated in simple terms without compromising the basic scientific analyses in the supporting documents. This is a fundamental prerequisite for successful climate negotiations, and decisions about...

Legally binding consequences The alpha and omega of the negotiations

As has been seen, the issue of the legal character of any binding consequences that would result from the Kyoto compliance system played a central role in the negotiations. At the outset, the mandate contained in Article 18 of the Protocol set an expectation and an ambition that binding consequences would form part of an effective compliance system. However, Article 18's links between such consequences and the need for an amendment to the Protocol complicated the situation and thus constrained those pressing for a clear legal outcome.

The climate change negotiations and the climate change regime

Despite its uniquely malign characteristics, governments were able to agree a regime, and embark on a continuous negotiation process centred on that regime, to address the problem of climate change.7 The nature and structure of the climate change regime, and the phases of the climate change negotiation process to date, are discussed below. The focus of this book is on the period since the entry into force of the UNFCCC and the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) in 1995, that is, comprising the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the post-Kyoto negotiations, and latterly the post-Marrakesh negotiations (see summary in Table 3.1). For the sake of completeness, however, and to provide the necessary contextual and chronological background, the overview below also discusses the earlier phases of regime building, development and review up to COP 1. In December 1990, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) launched negotiations on a framework convention on climate change to provide the...

The challenges of the climate change negotiations

Difficulties Delegation

As discussed in Chapter 2, two defining characteristics of global intergovernmental negotiations are complexity and inequality. The climate change negotiations exemplify these characteristics absolutely, exacerbated by the malign nature of climate change itself, as outlined above. This raises challenges to the successful unfolding of the climate change negotiations. Table 3.1 The three main phases of the climate change negotiations Table 3.1 The three main phases of the climate change negotiations Kyoto Protocol negotiations Negotiations launched by the 'Berlin Mandate' ar COP 1 that led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 3. Negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol conducted in the AGBM. The SBSTA and SBI also met to develop the Convention provisions further. The ad hoc group on Article 13 (AG13) was convened to negotiate a multilateral consultative process (ultimately unsuccessfully). Post-Kyoto negotiations Negotiations on the details of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the...

Domestic politics and international negotiations

Any significant international agreement on global warming will have profound effects on a broad set of interests spanning society and, hence, have important ramifications for the domestic politics of any country. Given the potential impact on important constituencies, global warming negotiations have become a concern of bureaucratic interests as activities coming under their purview become subject to negotiations. One sees, for example, competing claims arising between the departments and agencies responsible for policies on economics, environment, energy and foreign affairs. In the case of China, however, there may be questions about the degree to which such interests can be played out in the domestic arena. The precise nature of the policy process, in other words, may have important implications for the politics of global warming. The interaction of domestic politics and international negotiations emphasizes, at the national level, domestic interests pressing for policies conducive...

Adour River negotiations

The analysis in this chapter is based on a specific negotiation process regarding water allocation, water storage capacity, and water prices for users in the Adour catchment area in southwestern France. This example provides an excellent case study for analysis using the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model, because a substantial amount of information about the context of the negotiations is available. This information includes details about the hydrology of the river, the use of the water in agriculture, specific minimum flow requirements at specific points along the river, the political economy of water allocation in the region, and the explicit rules governing the negotiation process specified by the French central government, including the set of issues contained in the negotiation, the definition of different stakeholder groups included in the negotiation process, and what would happen if the negotiation process proved unsuccessful.1 The information on river hydrology...

Mexican Environmental Negotiations Gray Whales and the Desert Biosphere Reserve

Following the exposure of the plan, on February 27, 1995 the INE recommended against the saltworks project's (first) environmental impact assessment on the grounds that it now viewed the assessment as incompatible with the Biosphere Reserve's objectives. Within weeks of this change, battle lines were drawn. Numerous Mexican environmental groups, along with international supporters, challenged Herminio Blanco, head of Mexico's Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development and the president of the ESSA board of directors, along with almost every politician in Baja California Sur 32 . So began a struggle for increased transparency and pluralism within Mexico's environmental decision-making, and so also began the informal negotiations and bargaining for effective environmental conservation among governmental and non-governmental, domestic and international groups within Baja California Sur. regulations, the first time such a verdict had been handed down 31 . Through this maneuver, the...

Global intergovernmental negotiations Challenges

While all negotiations share the same fundamentals, specific negotiation types merit separate study. These are usually differentiated by the type of negotiating parties (e.g. individuals, labour organizations, governments) and their number. The particular negotiation type upon which we focus is a global intergovernmental negotiation, that is, where the main negotiating parties are sovereign states and the negotiation involves many such states. State governments are intricate negotiating parties. As individual negotiators, government representatives in an intergovernmental negotiation are accountable to their domestic legislatures. This is not unusual most negotiators, at any level, negotiate on behalf of a constituency, for example, a trade union. However, in negotiations among states, the relationship between the individual negotiator and his her constituency is particularly complex. States are not monolithic, and different government departments, as well as individuals within...

Substantive Negotiations Start Session Three Nairobi

The negotiations began to develop significantly during the Third Session in Nairobi in September 1991. It was here that the most salient issues began to crystallise and find themselves presented in texts which dominated not just the informal debate, but also the formal work of the Working Group. By the end of this session the negotiators were left with something approaching a single text on which it was agreed that they were all negotiating prior to that there was great disagreement, within Working Group I in particular, about what text should be used as the base negotiating text. The formal submissions made by states during the earlier session still remained as formal negotiating texts, and delegates would frequently intervene to complain that a point in their text had been missed out from the consolidated text produced in between the sessions by the Bureau.11 However, it should be stressed that, at least in the formal arena, the negotiating was at a fairly primitive level. Little of...

International negotiations and politics of climate change in China

Fairly early on in the process leading up to the climate change negotiations, China had begun to monitor developments in global warming, primarily as a consequence of the attention devoted to the climate change issue within the scientific community. In 1987, the SSTC established the National Climate Committee, with its secretariat located in the State Meteorological Administration (SMA). That same year the Chinese Academy of Sciences signed a collaborative research agreement with the US Department of Energy to study the effects of the increasing CO2 emissions on global, hemispheric, regional and local scales of climate change. Interdisciplinary studies on global climate change were also organized under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences and the SEPA. And as the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) got underway in the late 1980s, Chinese participation in the process was coordinated by the SMA. Out of Whereas initial Chinese interest in the climate change issue was...

China and multilateral negotiations on climate change

China was a participant in the negotiations for the FCCC from it preliminary stages. The FCCC is a framework convention that provides for general cooperation in climate change, with the anticipation of subsequent agreements establishing more concrete obligations. These have been discussed at the Conference of At COP3, China led the developing country opposition to FCCC mechanisms on the grounds that it would export emissions across boundaries and violate human rights and international equity. The heated debate at COP3 made the conference chairman, Ambassador Raul Estrada fear that the entire negotiations would blow apart (ENB 1997). China finally signed the Kyoto Protocol on May 29, 1998 only after statements from the developed world seemed to accept the Chinese view. For example, Gore said that we understand your first priority is to lift your citizens from poverty this is your right it will not be denied (South China Morning Post 1997a). However, the mechanisms and developing...

Explaining Chinas negotiating position

Although China's geographic constraints, demographic makeup and the historical legacies make environmental protection particularly difficult, environmental diplomacy has started to receive attention within the government due in large part to these objectives (Kobayashi forthcoming). This movement has, in turn, led domestic scholars to call for further research on how environmental diplomacy can be utilized to China's best interests (Cao et al. 1998 171-189 Zhao and Li 1998 195-199). Now the question becomes, if there does appear to be a consensus within China on the value of addressing climate change, why has China often been uncooperative in the international negotiations, at least at the multilateral level

Comparing multilateral and bilateral negotiations

Although both China and India have rhetorically opposed the AIJ CDM concepts on the grounds that the North first needs to address its responsibilities before the South, there is a difference in their activity on AIJs China has five AIJ projects whereas India has just one. However, it may be considered that part of the difference can be accounted for by China's greater economic appeal and specifically (in this context) an edge in attracting environmentally sound technologies. But what else accounts for the difference between China and India at the bilateral level First, it is important to consider the overall differences between multilateral and bilateral negotiations. Multilateral negotiations are generally more difficult since it is at these venues that new concepts and ideas are first discussed. Since the negotiations for the bilateral cooperative framework (AIJ CDM) were done at the multilateral level, the difficulties have already been addressed. In the case of AIJ, many of the...

The fundamentals of negotiations

A negotiation can be understood as 'a process of mutual persuasion and adjustment which aims at combining non-identical actor preferences into a single joint decision' (Rittberger, 1983, p170). Understood in this way, negotiations are a ubiquitous mechanism for decision-making at every level of social interaction and among a range of actors. Family members negotiate on their holiday destination, traders barter over goods, trade unions negotiate with employers over pay deals, governments launch negotiations on cross-border concerns. The negotiation process will typically pass through a number of stages. Firstly, participants will need to agree the agenda, or mandate, for the negotiation, setting out, for example, the issues to be covered, the deadline, and the main forum for the talks. Agreeing these basic conditions for the negotiation may in itself be contentious. The negotiation process proper will often start with a period of exploration of the issues on the agenda, which may...

Negotiations

The cardinal law of any textual development process is that it must always keep moving, thereby both reflecting and prompting the progress of negotiations from exploration and the tabling of proposals, to bargaining, to deal-making. If a textual development process gets stuck at any stage - publishing endless raw material from parties, say, or stubbornly lengthy negotiating texts session after session - this not only suggests that the negotiation is stagnating, but also perpetuates that stagnation, as weighty, complex documents raise obstacles to engaging in effective bargaining or deal-making. We now examine various cases of textual development in the climate change negotiations, focusing on the Kyoto and post-Kyoto negotiation processes. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind the differences between these two sets of negotiating rounds, notably the greater disaggregation of the latter. In the Kyoto negotiations, all texts - from the initial raw material from parties to the...

The Governance Of Ozone Depletion Ii Amending The Montreal Protocol Evaluation and Assessment The Evolution of US Rule

Through Montreal, the North-only negotiation rule model structured U.S. interactions in the negotiations. The United States formulated a negotiating position that ignored the South and focused on the EU. The result of this position (through intervening interactions) was the MP. When the United States began the MP negotiations, its rule model matched the normative context there was a good fit between the two. In the months preceding Montreal, however, the normative political context had begun to change because of Southern practices. Southern states became interested in the issue and, because of UNEP and Tolba, were able to participate. Now interested in the process, however, major Southern states expressed dissatisfaction with the provisions of the MP and refused to sign. Thus, very quickly after the international community agreed to the MP, U.S. rule models diverged from the normative context. The emerging critical mass of Southern agents altered the intersubjective understanding of...

Prelude to the Kyoto Protocol

Despite resistance from U.S. negotiators, the Berlin Mandate exempted developing countries from near-term, legally binding GHG emission reductions. Because the Berlin Mandate did not include developing countries in the first round of emission limits under the FCCC, some U.S. legislators claimed that the treaty would disadvantage U.S. companies. Concerns regarding American competitiveness with developing countries also raised questions about the accuracy of the 1991 NAS, which projected modest cost of GHG mitigation. cated midterm legally binding emission targets at the second Conference of the Parties (COP-2) in Geneva, both the cost of controlling GHG emissions and the consequences of noncompliance with the FCCC invited much more attention. The COP-2 ministerial declaration bore a stronger resemblance to the U.S. negotiating position than did the Berlin Mandate, but the U.S. position attracted sharp congressional criticism nonetheless.

Background emerging themes in global climate politics

Diversity of interests lie at the heart of climate politics. There are a number of notable coalitions of countries within the climate negotiations representing a range of perspectives on the issue.11 At one end of the spectrum there is the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that are dependent on exports of fossil fuels. This group of states has resisted any controls on the emission of greenhouse gases by continually drawing attention to the economic costs that will be incurred by action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and hence they may be said to constitute a 'veto' coalition in the negotiations (Porter and Brown 1991). Their strategy has been to hold up negotiations as much as possible by referring to rules of procedure, disputing the minutiae of draft texts and fiercely resisting the input of environmental NGOs during the negotiations. These states have been in close contact with the fossil fuel lobby...

China and the politics of climate change

In the context of climate change, China is the most important country in East Asia and perhaps the world in the long term. It contributes massively (albeit not on a per capita basis) to the pollutants causing global warming and, on a human scale, it will experience some of the greatest resulting hardship. The role of Chinese domestic and energy politics in the international climate change negotiations is explored by Michael T. Hatch in Chapter 3. Hatch argues that in most of the developing world global warming often hardly makes a ripple on the domestic scene, with more urgent problems like widespread poverty and degradation of air and water resources pressing upon local populations. What has become clear, however, is the necessity of developing country involvement if the climate change regime is to be effective in the long term. As suggested above, China clearly matters in this respect. Without substantial efforts on the part of China to limit future carbon dioxide emissions, any...

Formulating climate change policy in Japan

The third phase ran from 1992 to March 1995. There were no major events at the international level during this phase, but Japan's ratification of the FCCC allowed it to build a fundamental policy basis at home and influenced its foreign policy, especially at the regional level. The fourth phase went from the first conference of the parties (COP1) to the FCCC in March and April 1995, to COP3 in December 1997, when the parties to the FCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol. This phase included the process for negotiating the protocol. The fifth phase identified by Kameyama lasted from 1998 to 2001. During this phase Japan endeavored to influence the follow-up negotiations on implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Kameyama argues that the interface between international negotiations and domestic policies is where a variety of positions of subnational actors are consolidated into a country's single policy. She examines this interface by reference to a two-level game analysis, which encompasses...

The US Stance Obstacle to Effective International Action

Before Kyoto, the U.S. negotiating position demanded meaningful participation of key developing countries. This served not only as a way to delay substantive action on climate change but also as a wedge in G77 unity. After getting host country Argentina and South Korea, members of the G77, to agree to voluntary commitments, the United States upheld them as examples of developing countries that wanted to see the Kyoto Protocol work. The definition of meaningful participation was left purposely obscure Even if it eventually resulted only in developing countries agreeing to trade in emissions credits, it would give the United States and its allies a chance to meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments without domestic action. Meanwhile, the United States is capitalizing on the fact that a protocol without their ratification is virtually meaningless because they are the world's largest emitters of carbon dioxide. The U.S. Senate, negotiators, and industry have capitalized on their ability to...

Participatory interplay

A second category of states, including Russia should it decide to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, are industrial countries committed under Annex B of the Protocol but which are not members of WTO. Should the Enforcement Branch conclude that parties in this category have exceeded their assigned amounts of emissions in the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period, the consequences that are internal to the regime will definitely be costly. Notably, these parties would be suspended from eligibility to make transfers under Article 17, they would be required to prepare Compliance Action Plans, and their assigned amount for the second commitment period would be reduced by a quantity corresponding to their excess emissions multiplied by a factor of 1.3.33 On the other hand, the uncertainty and inaccuracy of the underlying information, and the double majority required in the Enforcement Branch for decisions on whether to proceed with a case after a preliminary examination, provide ample opportunity...

Presiding officers should be able to supply strong processoriented leadership

The single factor that can make the greatest difference to a negotiation process is the presence of an effective presiding officer. Although different types of negotiations and negotiating rounds require different skills, in all cases, objectivity, determination, strong decision-making capabilities, and longstanding negotiating experience in the particular regime are key factors in facilitating effective chairing and process-oriented leadership. A real problem in this regard, common throughout the international arena, is that the election of presiding officers is usually determined more by political considerations than suitability for the post in terms of skills and attributes.

Summary and concluding remarks

A key underlying message of this chapter is the importance of texts as a tool for the negotiations. Texts do not only reflect the status of negotiations, but can also help move the process forwards. They can do this in two main ways. Firstly, by codifying progress so that it becomes real. Through negotiations based on texts, agreement is built up and solidified as language is painstakingly approved word by word, comma by comma. Secondly, texts can serve as an indispensable tool to actually facilitate the work of negotiators. Given the complexity of the climate change negotiations, there is a great need for clear and manageable negotiating texts that are able to capture the state of play and highlight outstanding issues and options, thereby helping negotiators to focus their minds on the key questions requiring their attention. Otherwise, negotiators can often waste time simply trying to make sense of the text and the ideas expressed therein. A carefully managed textual development...

Strategy and Universal Participation

In chapter 2, I argued that universal negotiations are not rational from the standpoint of effectiveness or efficiency, and it appeared doubtful that they were a strategic choice of the United States, designed to slow or stall the negotiations by adding extra negotiators and issues. The latter of these two possibilities is the stickiest issue. As the climate change issue rose in prominence in the late 1980s, it became clear that the United States did not favor aggressive action to address climate change (a reluctance discussed below). If we take the findings from positive political economy (or practical negotiation experience) to heart namely, that large negotiations are inefficient and ineffective then it does seem plausible that the United States would press for universal negotiations in order to slow cripple a treaty that it did not desire in the first place. Further, as hegemon, the United States would have the power to sway the foundations of the global governance of climate...

Time management tools

A constant danger in a negotiation process is that it may get stuck in a particular stage - incessantly exploring issues, not making the transition to bargaining, avoiding deal-making - either due to the efforts of obstructionist parties or through simple procrastination and excessive brinkmanship. As one interviewee admitted, 'our one failing as negotiators is that we sometimes think the process could go on forever'. It is thus vital for the organizers of the negotiation process - the presiding officers and secretariat - to place constant pressure on parties to move ahead in the negotiations, and to instil dynamism and momentum to offset the natural propensity to backload the negotiations. The organizers can wield a number of tools to this end exerting leadership to move negotiations up a gear in procedural and organizational terms, notably through the convening of new negotiating arenas and preparation of more advanced negotiating texts We now explore how time was used in the Kyoto...

Conclusion and policy implications

Second, there are at least three reasons to expect or recommend the implementation of the downstream incremental distribution (or the transfer scheme t d ) in international river agreements (a) it assigns to every coalition of sovereign countries at least its noncooperative value (that is, the welfare that this coalition can achieve on its own) (b) it is a compromise between two conflicting fairness principles invoked during international river disputes, the absolute territorial sovereignty and the unlimited territorial integrity and (c) it is the outcome of a game defined by simple negotiation rules. Basically, those rules assign more negotiation power to downstream countries than to upstream countries. If they adhere to the absolute territorial sovereignty and unlimited territorial integrity principles, countries might include these negotiation rules in international river-sharing agreements. Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes and to plan...

The Kyoto Protocol Congressional Debate Heats Up

The Kyoto negotiations proved difficult because parties found it difficult to achieve consensus on whether developing countries as well as developed countries should assume binding emissions limitations, which GHGs to cover, what level of emission reductions to require of each country, and whether to include flexible compliance mechanisms. Negotiators finalized the text of the Kyoto Protocol only after an eleventh-hour intervention by Vice President Gore. The protocol requires the United States to reduce its annual GHG emissions to 7 percent below 1990 emissions during the first commitment period scheduled for 2008-2012.17 American negotiators successfully lobbied for the inclusion of the flexibility mechanisms joint implementation (JI), emission trading, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the protocol. JI, which is popular with many U.S. companies and some conservation groups, allows countries to earn credit for emission reductions that result from conservation projects...

Green NGOs and the compliance regime

To measure influence, we will rely on two data sources goal attainment, measured as the correspondence between NGOs' positions and proposals and actual negotiations outcomes and ego and alter perceptions, i.e. how NGOs perceive their influence themselves and how negotiators and other key actors judge their influence. As we have interviewed mostly NGOs, there is a chance that we may overestimate their influence. Also, interviews were conducted with a limited number of actors, but we believe them to be some of the most important ones relating to the compliance issue. The conformity between the environmental community's positions and the actual negotiation outcome as stated in texts and final agreements is one indicator of their influence in the design of the compliance system.

Getting the timing right

Comparing the experience of the Kyoto and post-Kyoto negotiations also highlights the importance of timing in the production of Chair's texts. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Chair Estrada presented his Chair's text one full negotiating session before COP 3. This was sufficiently late to have allowed ample opportunity for parties to streamline and consolidate their own textual proposals as far as they could, but also gave parties time to familiarize themselves with the Chair's text, work with it, and make it their own before the final round of negotiations at COP 3. As one interviewee put it, 'people had a meeting to feel comfortable with the text, they thought about it in the inter-sessional period, and then went into Kyoto to have results'. Another commented ' it wasn't easy to manage Estrada's text with all its In contrast, the first President's text for the post-Kyoto negotiations was circulated only on the evening of the second to last day of negotiations, less...

Procedure as strategy

It is not uncommon in the climate change negotiations for some parties, when faced with a proposal to which they object, to invoke procedural arguments for why it cannot be discussed (e.g. non-availability of a text in all languages, insufficient time to consider it). It is similarly not uncommon for some parties to seek to delay the negotiation process more generally by insisting on procedural adherence (e.g. on interpretation or translation, or strict application of the no-more-than-two-meetings rule) (see Yamin and Depledge, 2004). One interviewee claimed 'If the Saudi delegate puts his request for translation in perfect English it's very clear that it's a trick and nothing else'. The line between legitimate and illegitimate procedural challenge is, of course, a fine one. Most procedural concerns are motivated by genuine concern over loss of procedural equity and transparency. Nevertheless, it is also undoubtedly the case that obstructionist parties sometimes insist on the rigid...

Loose ends from a fragmented negotiating process

The highly complex nature of the Kyoto Protocol, made necessary by the complex nature of the problem to which it responds, presented serious practical challenges to the negotiators. The compliance system sits at the heart of the operation of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms and of the reporting and review procedures. However, during the negotiations, each of these issues was assigned to a separate working group. At several stages in the negotiations, delegations and the chairs of the various groups sought to ensure that cross-cutting and interlinking issues such as the links between the mechanisms and compliance were either clearly assigned to one negotiating group, or that they were taken in up in parallel in a conscious manner. A further controversial issue, and the last to be resolved by negotiators in Marrakesh, was the relationship between the compliance system and the rules that would determine eligibility to participate in the Kyoto mechanisms. As has been described, the...

Business Reaction to the Kyoto Protocol

There are varying reactions to the Kyoto Protocol in the business community, depending on the particulars of the businesses involved. Businesses that are strongly supportive of the protocol's targets and timetables often see market opportunities that will be created as a result of the government support of climate-friendly technologies promised by the protocol. A second group recognizes the inevitability of some effort to reduce human impact on the climate and, in this context, regards the Kyoto targets as a reasonable first step. Others believe that the targets and timetables are unrealistic and that the negotiators have vastly underestimated the economic consequences of trying to achieve them. This third group tends to oppose these, but generally not all, aspects of the Kyoto Protocol. A further reality is that so far most businesses remain untouched by the negotiations or unconvinced by the science and thus indifferent to the issues.

The final negotiating texts

In every negotiation, there comes a crunch point when it is clear to delegates that the endpoint has been reached, and a deal must be struck (or abandoned). The negotiating text that the deal-making arena (see Chapter 9) has before it at that point is crucial. Most importantly, the text should faithfully codify all the deals and agreements reached to date, presenting familiar, almost entirely clean text, and only a small number of square brackets or alternative paragraphs denoting key outstanding issues. The aim is to focus the minds of negotiators (often ministers) solely on these issues, whose resolution will lead to the final compromise. A good example is the final deal-making round of the post-Kyoto negotiations on compliance at COP 6 (part II). Here, agreement had been reached on the President's text - the Core Elements paper - presented by the COP 6 President, except for the section on compliance. After extensive shuttle diplomacy (see Chapter 9), disagreement was whittled down...

Potential for incoherence and inconsistency

The specialization of the negotiations can result in incoherence and inconsistency in the final outcomes, as even the presiding officers and secretariat find it difficult to keep abreast of developments in the various groups and maintain a big picture view of the process. This situation during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations contributed to some incoherence and inconsistency in the Protocol text, which negotiators have had to contend with in the post-Kyoto negotiations. According to Yamin so that few outside the larger delegations could follow the entirety of the negotiations. These factors go some way to explaining the idiosyncrasies of the text (Yamin, 1998, pp115-116). A lot of negotiations have been done independently in small groups where macro pictures were not able to be conceived today many people come and tell you 'Why should you levy a share of the proceeds of the CDM to help vulnerable developing countries adapt to climate change and not other mechanisms '. simply because...

Developed and developing countries differing ministerial input

One of the major challenges for involving ministers directly in the negotiations is the much greater activity of industrialized country ministers relative to those from developing countries (Yamin and Depledge, 2004). Although developing countries are usually represented at ministerial level at major COP sessions, their delegations often continue, in practice, to be led by officials, with ministers confining themselves to ceremonial activities. There are, of course, notable exceptions to the rather low profile of non-Annex I ministers. The South African minister, for example, was highly active at COP 6 (part II) and, especially, COP 7, while the Tanzanian minister played an important role in discussions on the LDC fund at COP 9. The profile of the Nigerian minister at COP 6 (part I), where he held the post of G-77 Chair, was also high. Several developing country interviewees spoke of the problems they faced in securing effective participation by their ministers in the climate change...

Design of the compliance regime

Compliance has been described as an atypical issue in international climate negotiations, characterized by the small number of actors involved and a lack of strong opinions (interview with Dovland, 2002 interview with Wiser, 2002). Until Bonn (COP-6 part 2, July 2001) and Marrakesh (COP-7, October November 2001), the compliance issue was low on the agenda during the negotiations. The questions of targets and timetables and the flexibility mechanisms took most of the negotiators' energy. Until the final stages of the negotiations, compliance received scant attention not only from the negotiators but also from most of the NGO community. This, however, provided a window of opportunity for green NGOs with particular expertise and competence (interview with Wiser, 2002). The legal character of any consequences of non-compliance caused much controversy in the negotiations. All the major green NGOs favoured legally binding consequences, but the decision was deferred to the first Conference...

Lesson in Negotiation Arithmetic

Howard Raiffa in The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982) and James Sebenius in Negotiating the Law of the Sea (1984) emphasize the importance of properly sequencing issue addition and subtraction.3 As issues are added or taken away, not only does the number of parties change but strategic alliances are altered. If this is done purposefully, with the support of all the parties, it can make the difference between success and failure in global environmental treaty negotiations. If it happens in an unplanned way, or without the support of the key stakeholders, it can undermine the prospects of reaching agreement. In general, the purpose of adding or subtracting issues (and parties) is to create additional value. This is accomplished by exploiting the differing degrees of importance that each party attaches to the issues on a negotiation agenda. According to Raiffa and Sebenius, parties can widen their zone of possible agreement by adding new issues. They can strengthen a coalition or...

The first two stages

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the time management of the first and second stages of the post-Kyoto negotiations was problematic. Some issues - notably compliance and LULUCF - did follow a relatively coherent process passing through the first two stages of the negotiations - with exploration followed by the tabling of proposals, leading to a tentative transition to bargaining - as reflected in the development of their negotiating texts (see Chapter 11). Other issues, notably the flexibility mechanisms and adverse effects, appeared to remain stuck at the stage of exploration and tabling of proposals, without any transition to bargaining prior to (or even at) COP 6. Negotiating texts either swelled or stagnated. On most issues, there was a sense that the positions of parties became more, rather than less, entrenched over time as COP 6 approached. Unofficial contacts among delegations behind the scenes, although they occurred, simply did not yield the same kind of...

Expectations and the dangers of overreliance

This expectation, however, does hold the danger of inducing over-reliance on the part of officials that ministers 'who yesterday were thinking of something totally different and tomorrow will think about something totally different again would suddenly come in and crack two or three seemingly uncrackable points' (interview). As the Russian delegate stated on the eve of COP 3, 'there is a view that the ministers will come in next week and decide everything. We should not leave everything to them this would be a mistake' (AGBM 8, 1997f). This heavy reliance on ministers can be seen as part of the tendency to brinkmanship and the backloading of negotiations, as discussed in Chapter 12. Effective ministerial decision-making is in fact critically 'dependent on bureaucratic legwork' (Wettestad, 1999, p213). That is, it is important for the negotiating officials to resolve the bulk of the issues, leaving only a small number of political questions for ministers to consider. A stark...

Fundamental Flaws in the Convention Protocol Approach

Most recent international environmental negotiations have followed a two-step approach. An initial series of meetings is held to review scientific evidence and draft a framework convention. Then, subsequent meetings of the signatories focus on the preparation of detailed protocols. The convention-protocol approach has produced a number of agreements (see Appendix A), the Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention being the most recent examples of first-step agreements. The Montreal Protocol is the best-known example of what the second step in the two-step process is supposed to generate. The 1992 Climate Change Convention sets no targets or timetables (even though many countries, particularly the Europeans, wanted them). Instead, subsequent meetings will consider the results of ongoing scientific inquiries and explore the possibility of adopting specific implementation measures. In the meantime, some nations have unilaterally adopted timetables and targets that affect...

Different NGOs Different strategies resources and targets

Against this backdrop we differentiate between two main strategies.5 First, an NGO can pursue an insider strategy, seeking to attain influence by working closely with negotiators and governments by providing policy solutions and expert advice. There are many US-based groups in this category. They also engage in knowledge construction, producing research-based reports and papers on particular topics (Gough and Shackley, 2001, p338). Second, NGOs can pursue an outsider strategy promoting compliance with international agreements by putting pressure on negotiators, governments and target groups through campaigning, letters of protest, rallying, direct actions, boycotts and even civil disobedience. The tactic here is to influence public opinion in order to induce states to be more flexible in international negotiations, to push governments to comply with international commitments, and to give polluters and environmentally harmful corporations negative public exposure. 1 International...

From facilitation to enforcement Conventional wisdom revisited

Assessing the extent to which the Kyoto Protocol's compliance system reflects a major shift in thinking among delegations requires a quick look back at previous efforts to develop compliance systems for the climate change regime. The compliance system is the third to have been attempted by climate change negotiators over the past decade. The first effort, made during the negotiation of the Convention, was abandoned in favour of an 'enabling provision' in Article 13 of the UNFCCC, which calls upon the Convention parties to 'consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative process for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention'. As it became apparent during the negotiations of the FCCC that the treaty would not result in specified, legally binding emissions reduction commitments, delegations determined that a compliance system could await the development of more specific treaty commitments. The second effort followed the entry into force of the...

Sinks flexibility mechanisms and compliance

ED relies on a market-based approach. According to Newell (2000, p128), ED 'boasts the largest assemblage of scientists, economists and lawyers of any national NGO working on climate change'. In contrast to most expert organizations, ED has quite a large member base. It was also among the main architects behind the US system of tradable sulphur dioxide (SO2) permits, designed and put into operation more than a decade ago (interview with Petsonk, 2002). ED has worked relentlessly to get the negotiators to adopt a similar approach for the international climate regime. Considering its expertise, close interaction with the US administration and political clout, there is reason to believe that it has had an effect on the design of the Kyoto mechanisms, which are mainly a US brainchild (Grubb et al, 1999). In general, ED has sided with the US against the EU in its interpretation of the Kyoto mechanisms.18 ED is also among the few environmental NGOs supporting the previous US administration...

Developing countries and the burdens of sovereignty

Given the potential divergence of interests, developing country negotiators, through the Group of 77, remained remarkably united and consistent in their participation in the design of the compliance system. Although individual delegations contributed specific proposals, the Group was strongest in its insistence on two design elements a strong enforcement system, and one applicable exclusively to Annex I parties.29 While the rationale for their general support for the second element is clear, explaining the first element of the G-77 position is not straightforward. As has been described, although developing countries will not have specific and binding commitments under the Protocol and will not be subject to its jurisdiction, they do have a longstanding tradition of defence against international organizations making inroads into sovereignty. If one compares, for example, China, Samoa and Saudi Arabia, these G-77 members have very different national interests with regard to the...

Side events and exhibits

A second, very important spur to the growth of side events is the unrelenting politicization of the formal climate change negotiations, which forecloses many avenues of debate on the grounds of political sensitivity. So many subjects have become taboo that side events have emerged as an alternative safe outlet for open discussion and debate on these topics (see also Chapter 10). The best example is that of future commitments for all parties in the formal negotiations, the item that would provide a home for such a discussion has not even made it onto the formal agenda, and instead has been held in acrimonious abeyance for the past five years. It is no exaggeration to say that the mere mention of future commitments or negotiations on these is taboo in the formal regime. However, recent negotiating sessions have seen a wealth of side events on this very topic, usually with presentations and in-depth debate involving both developed and developing country NGO delegates. As one interviewee...

The Politics of Food Scarcity

For more than 40 years, international trade negotiations have been dominated by grain-exporting countries principally the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia pressing for greater access to markets in importing countries. Now the world may be moving into a period dominated not by surpluses but by shortages. In this case, the issue becomes not exporters' access to markets but importers' access to supplies.10

Negotiationbargaining

Nevertheless the climate negotiations in particular were regarded as being at the forefront ofattempts to open up international negotiations to NGO participation,54 in that all sessions (with the exception of the 'informal informals' mentioned above), including working groups, were open and several countries included NGO representatives in their delegations (Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994 120).55 WWF-Switzerland even had direct access to the Open-Ended Working Group, which drafted the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, as well as being part of the Swiss national delegation during the scientific and ministerial components of the conference (Boyer 1997). Conca (1993 450) considers that sitting on negotiating delegations is the most important vehicle for NGO influence, and on this basis argues that NGOs on the delegations of more powerful states such as the US have enjoyed the greatest influence over policy at this level. For Princen (1994 37), 'In negotiations...

What has experience so far to say about the role of science

Our knowledge about possible future changes of climate was in many regards still limited and uncertain when the IPCC First Assessment was presented to the UN General Assembly in 1990. This was clearly pointed out by the IPCC. A less carefully prepared assessment could have been seriously questioned, but analyses by well-recognised scientists gave credibility to the reports particularly that of Working Group I on the scientific basis, and these could therefore serve as the basis for negotiations. Also, country delegates to the INC could ask scientists at home about their views and receive an independent scientific evaluation, since hundreds of scientists from all over the world had taken part in the IPCC work and had in a way implicitly agreed with the conclusions. The direct contacts between negotiators and representatives of the IPCC also meant that a mutual respect had gradually been established between these groups. It was obviously important not to hide uncertainty, and also to...

The climate change problem

Climate change is commonly viewed as a uniquely 'malign' problem (see Wettestad, 1999 Miles et al, 2002), presenting 'the decision maker with a set of formidable complications' (IPCC, 1996, p7). While there is a tendency for all negotiators to see 'their' issue as the most difficult in the international arena, climate change does have a good case for this distinction.2 countries, all regions, and all individuals have the potential to contribute to the problem, even though, as discussed below, they do so to varying extents. This means that, to develop an effective response to climate change, the negotiations do need to involve all the world's states, or at least a critical mass of those most responsible for, and potentially vulnerable to, the problem. international climate change negotiations have involved a greater number of actors as well as many more kinds of actors than any of the numerous sets of multilateral negotiations that have occurred in the post-war era (Barrett and...

The Governance Process Unfolds Negotiating The Fccc

The international community began negotiations toward a framework convention in early 1991, with a goal of producing an agreement in time for the Earth Summit to be held in June 1992. The normative context for these negotiations mirrored the results of the ozone depletion negotia-tions the universal participation norm dominated and states understood (for the most part) that a global response entailed North-first action, and Northern support for Southern participation. The U.S. rule model for climate change called for universal participation while the United States simultaneously emphasized the uncertainty in climate science and the economic costs of action to justify a lack of commitment to binding emission reductions. It was with this rule model, and in this context that the United States hosted INC I in February 1991. It was at INC I when the international community and the United States began to reap the benefits and disadvantages of universal participation. These negotiations...

Stage Two Lockin around Universal Participation

The NLC framework further hypothesizes that after the transition from North-only to universal participation in the ozone depletion negotiations, the observed lock in that influenced the early climate change negotiations arose through internalization the fourth stage of the NLC. In the internalization stage, the new idea becomes an intersubjective reality it becomes natural and locked in. This is hypothesized to have occurred between the ozone depletion negotiations and the climate change negotiations. Universal participation becomes an ingrained part of agent rule models constituting identities, interests, and behaviors. The new norm will become ingrained and natural as its dictates are followed and positive feedback reinforces the actions taken. Once multiple agents have been persuaded or socialized to include a new rule in their internal models, that rule must produce behavior that is positively evaluated or the rule will not continue to be used and the norm will erode. Through...

Taking the Environment Seriously in the WTO

It is now abundantly clear that developing countries will not accept an outcome from multilateral trade negotiations that does not confer on them or at least the more vocal of them tangible trade benefits and that does not go some way toward correcting existing inequities and imbalances. Although it is hard to imagine an outcome in which all countries will benefit, any acceptable outcome will have to offer clear benefits to developing countries in some form, even if not directly due to trade openness. Development has now become a genuine trade imperative.

The evolution of a tuna fishery

This was no trivial accomplishment, given the sorts of problems faced by small island nations having to deal with highly mobile, sophisticated fishing fleets, with large multinational, vertically integrated industries, and with the individual vessel's flag government. For example, by 1986 Seychelles had signed major fishing fee agreements with the European Economic Community (EEC) for 27 (French) vessels, with the Spanish government, with private Spanish firms, and with the Ivory Coast. Now that Spain is a member of EEC, another 20-30 vessels fall under EEC negotiations and considerable pressure has been brought to bear on the Seychellois negotiators, as the EEC conglomerate interests are better situated to wrangle political deals that tend to work against Seychellois interests. To date, the relationships with early partners have been beneficial to the Seychelles in many regards and, given that the global economy is somewhat more stable than it was when these negotiations began, the...

Giving Science Its

It is rare when science drives politics, rather than the reverse. The Montreal Protocol negotiations suggest, though, that this is possible. From the point at which stratospheric ozone depletion was discovered, through the subsequent agreement by the signatories to ban CFCs and The first discovery, the theory that CFCs might be linked to ozone depletion, led to the banning of aerosols in the United States and, ultimately, to the 1985 Vienna Convention on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. Discovery of the ozone hole heightened political awareness and encouraged greater funding of research into its possible causes. When two rival theories emerged about the causes of the hole, a political rift developed. Countries that supported CFC limitations and those that opposed them used the theoretical disagreement to push their own political agenda. Eventually, science played a large role in bringing about political compromise the development of substitutes for CFCs enabled politicians who...

Policy process increasing complexity and implementation failure

We suggest that climate change negotiations are incomparably more complex than this. Putnam was writing from a top-down, United States perspective, where the separation of powers at the federal level is a significant factor. The executive branch of government can sign treaties, but they can be ratified only if supported by a substantial majority in the legislative branch of government (by a two-thirds majority of the Senate). Nevertheless, the politics of ratification is important for even those nations where such formal scrutiny by the legislature is not present. This is because the decisional logic that might carry negotiators to the point of consensus in the international arena might also take them some distance beyond the preferred national position when viewed subsequently in the cold light of day. In addition, and of major importance to the intensity of political processes, is the simple fact that 'Nature' cannot act for itself. Nature's 'interests' are by no means clear but...

Unity and continuity are important

The climate change negotiations appear to have fared better under a single presiding officer, a single negotiating body and a single secretariat team for a negotiating round (the Kyoto Protocol negotiations) than under multiple presiding officers, negotiating bodies, and secretariat teams (the post-Kyoto negotiations). Where the complexity of the negotiation process requires multiple institutional actors, there should be strong and continuous communication between them, with overall responsibility vested in a senior political figure throughout the negotiating round.

Realistic Estimate of Forest Conservation for Climate Mitigation

Emission reductions in developed countries. For example, Greenpeace suggested that 300 million tons of carbon via forest conservation could enter the carbon market, which would lower the total cost of mitigation and prevent other emission reductions. Greenpeace remarked in a widely distributed paper that the introduction of this amount (300 million tons) of very cheap projects in the CDM equation will drastically reduce the amount of money and technology transferred to developing countries, remove the incentive to develop less carbon intensive technologies in developing countries and allow industrialized countries to increase their emission close to business as usual.78 A WWF briefing paper (which had several math errors but was circulated widely at negotiations) pointed out that forest conservation in the Amazon would allow industrialized countries to emit in each of the five years of the commitment period more than 1.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.79 Let's take...

Conclusions Key Insights

The objective of this book was always a simple and humble one to improve understanding of the organization of global negotiations, and how organizational factors can impact on the course of a negotiation process. The preceding chapters discussed in detail organizational factors at play in the climate change negotiations, throwing light onto the usually unseen organizational world that lies behind the visible face of the negotiation process. It is now time to distil some more general lessons from the detailed analysis presented in those chapters. This concluding chapter takes on this task, by drawing together 12 key insights from the experience of the climate change negotiations that could provide useful lessons for other global negotiation processes.

Critique of regime approaches

Regime theory tends to overlook the bureaucratic, intragovernmental constraints that are imposed on government foreign policy, a fact that limits its explanatory use in relation to global warming.10 There is a lack of attention to the way in which the realisation of foreign policy goals may be frustrated by the presence of domestic interests (Kydd and Snidal 1995). However, looking at the processes behind the national positions that states adopt in negotiations helps to illustrate the degree of manoeuvre that negotiators have in international fora. In this regard, Gupta et al. (1993 18) argue that 'Only by recognising the ongoing political struggle behind governmental positions on climate and by identifying the societal groups involved is it possible to analyse the dynamics of the formulation of national positions on climate change.' Conversely governments need to 'anticipate domestic reactions' (Levy et al. 1993 Milner 1992 493), given that they have a 'fixed investment in a...

Stability of Outcomes

7 Parallel Climate Blocs Incentives to Cooperation in International Climate Negotiations 137 9 Heterogeneity of Countries in Negotiations of International Environmental Agreements A Joint Discussion of the Buchner-Carraro, Eyckmans-Finus, and Chander-Tulkens Chapters 187 Sylvie Thoron

Influence Of Interests And The International Policy Process

Exert its influence in international negotiations it may come too late, and so it seeks to try to contest regulation at the national level (ibid., 343 Kellow, 2002). The UN bureaucracy is not directly dependent for revenues upon healthy national economies and is above any competition to attract capital it is thus insulated from the economic consequences of international policies to the extent that this is a source of concern to some observers (Levy and Egan, 1998, 347). Levy and Egan note that despite the vast resources potentially available to business groups, their influence has not thus far overwhelmed that of environmental NGOs at international negotiations (ibid., 45). Their influence is also weakened by the diversity of industry interests which often prevents business from acting as a cohesive bloc (ibid., 346). While the rhetoric in environmental politics at the international level is often redistributive and accentuated by linkage with development issues, the policies adopted...

Corporate influence on US climate policy

As noted, the GCC and the US oil industry have not been very active on compliance systems related to the Protocol.13 Since the Kyoto mechanisms and compliance systems are means of meeting the Protocol's targets for Annex I country emissions, the support of oil companies and other corporate actors for these systems varies with their support for the Protocol. Representatives of the GCC were present in the international negotiations on compliance, but they never took the floor.14 Their strategy has been to cripple US climate policy and put the entire Kyoto Protocol out of action by lobbying against any binding targets and timetables within the US. In the period leading up to Kyoto, lobbying activities intensified in the US (Kolk, 2001). For example, the GCC sponsored a US 13 million television campaign that claimed that the price of petrol would increase by 50 cents per gallon if Kyoto timetables were implemented.16 In July 1997 - five months before the Kyoto meeting - the Senate voted...

The Evolution of Universal Participation and the Governance of Climate Change

The FCCC was only the first step in governing climate change, and it was recognized by most as an inadequate first step. The governance of climate change would begin in earnest in the mid-1990s as the international community would grapple with more concrete and binding ways to address the problem. Rafe Pomerance (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Development) observed that a s part of the 'bargain' struck in Rio between those who advocated more stringent commitments and those wary of moving too quickly, the parties agreed that the adequacy of commitments would be reviewed at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties . . .1 The negotiations that followed the FCCC would prove to be more contentious than those that led to its creation. Agreeing to the rather vague goals of stabilizing the climate and voluntarily freezing emissions would prove a relatively easy task compared with agreeing to a set of binding regulations designed to make those goals a...

The Chicago Climate Exchange

Throughout the Kyoto negotiations, the European Union was preparing its collective responsive to the climate change challenge. In the meantime, a voluntary group in the United States was preparing to establish a pilot trading program known as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) to build institutions and skills. This turned out to be an extremely prescient decision, given the federal government's subsequent withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiations. Membership is drawn from a broad array of North American corporations, plus some municipalities, universities, and institutions. Trading in the six greenhouse gases opened in December 2003. CCX is now established in Europe (the European Climate Exchange a joint venture with the International Petroleum Exchange in London), in Canada (the Montreal Climate Exchange in partnership with the Montreal Exchange), and has plans to open offices in Japan, Russia, and New York. A Chinese technology company has become the latest member.

Synchronizing Worldwide Expectations

During the months preceding the Earth Summit, the negotiations over the Climate Change Convention snagged several times, usually as the result of the efforts of some countries to get others to back down or accept less. Part of the problem, though, was also the result of a serious mismatch in expectations. For some leaders, the Earth Summit was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to shatter the prevailing logic of Western-style economic growth, and to force the North to accept limitations on its use of world resources. For them, the negotiations over individual treaties provided an occasion to raise much larger concerns. Other leaders were more interested in consolidating support for emerging general principles like sus-tainability and the polluter pays so that these would become a starting point in all future environmental treaty negotiations. Still others were primarily concerned with the issue of global warming they wanted to extract commitments that would slow the rate of global...

The climate change institutions

A separate body was convened to conduct the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, known as the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM). The conduct of negotiations in a specially convened, dedicated body rather than using the existing subsidiary bodies had several advantages. Importantly, it provided a clear channel for the exercise of strong process-oriented leadership by that body's Chair, Ra l Estrada, enabling him to take responsibility for the full negotiation process in a coherent manner (see also Chapter 4). According to an interviewee, 'you need that kind of single unitarian leadership to push that sort of thing through, where everyone feels a common kind of commitment'. A single body also conferred greater status and distinction on the process, providing a focus for public and media attention, and ensuring that more time was dedicated to the negotiations. Another advantage was that dealing with all issues under one institutional umbrella helped to maintain coherence in the...

Putting the rules into practice

Given the higher transaction costs that they impose, the structure provided by the rules for the conduct of business is generally a rather loose one. The rules are used to structure and order the negotiation process, as well as to enhance procedural equity and transparency, yet at the same time they are applied pragmatically, regularly bypassed and, at times, relaxed, when the transaction costs that they impose threaten to impede the negotiations. It is extremely important, however, for the organizers of the negotiation process - the presiding officers, bureau and secretariat - to make sure that a balance is secured. Enough of the key rules for the conduct of business must be upheld enough of the time to maintain an acceptable level of procedural equity and transparency, if the legitimacy of the negotiations is not to suffer.

Procrastination must be resisted and bargaining and dealmaking promoted

Another central aim of the negotiation process must be to resolutely counter the inherent tendency of delegates to backload negotiations, stagnate in the initial exploratory stage, and delay the start of intensive bargaining. Although organizational tools - such as the use of texts, negotiating arenas, verbal exhortation, symbolic markers and reinforcement of the deadline - can rarely avoid the marathon, late night meetings that characterize finales of major negotiating rounds, they can ensure that the workload for those last minute negotiations is not insurmountable. Again, the failure to resist procrastination is commonly cited as a factor in the collapse of COP 6.

The first and second stages

In most negotiations, the first couple of sessions are dedicated to exploration of the issues. The AGBM, for example, embarked on an explicit process of 'analysis and assessment' for a year between COP 1 and COP 2. The postKyoto LULUCF negotiations similarly began by inviting parties to present data and commissioning the IPCC to prepare a Special Report. The exploration stage can be long, often taking up half of the available meeting time. This can be frustrating, as little progress in forging an agreement is apparently registered. Reaching agreement in a global negotiation, however, requires not only substantive bargaining and deal-making, but also a preparatory learning process that lays the groundwork for that bargaining through investigation and study of the issues, often accompanied by considerable posturing on the part of delegates. As one interviewee noted with respect to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, 'we had to go through two years of learning, figuring out other...

US Responsibility for Weakening the Kyoto Protocol

At the Kyoto negotiations in 1997, the United States came out the undisputed victor, having totally outwitted both the EU and G77 and China, the two major blocs opposing it. Kyoto was a grand bargain between a magnanimous U.S. commitment to reduce its emissions below its 1990 levels something that the world media immediately hailed and the acceptance of various trading mechanisms by other groups. Everything was contorted to fit this bargain. Brazil's proposal for a punitive Clean Development Fund miraculously turned into a market-based North-South tool for emission trading called the CDM. Emission trading between nations got into the protocol literally in the last hour of the conference, well after the official clock had been stopped. Russia and Ukraine, despite their extremely low emissions compared with 1990, calmly walked away with no commitments to reduce below their 1990 levels, making a huge amount of emission trading a reality at throwaway rates. In current discussions,...

New Normative Context for Global Responses

The story of the normative context in this period is less convoluted than the story of the actual negotiations, though the two are inextricably linked. In 1988, multiple states quickly acceded to the new norm, a cascade expected by the constructivist complex adaptive framework. The South emerged as a critical mass altering the normative context for the rest of the states negotiating the ozone agreements. Their altered practices taking an active interest in the negotiations and not signing the MP had a profound effect on what manner of negotiation would be considered appropriate in the 1988-1990 period. The North could no longer expect to achieve Southern cooperation without addressing Southern concerns without Southern participation in the process. In 1988, Northern states came to recognize the appropriateness of universal negotiations as well. The United States (and other Northern states) replaced its North-only rule model with one that called for universal negotiations. In 1989, the...

Instrument implementation

Implementing carbon taxes or emissions trading in practice requires consultation with relevant stakeholders. Within a country's government commonly the Ministry of the Environment would be charged with developing a carbon tax. This Ministry would typically develop a proposal with the help of stakeholder negotiations. Those stakeholders that will have to pay the tax mainly industry will negotiate hard for exemptions and reductions from a tax or for a larger emission quota allocation. Environmental advocates will argue for higher tax rates and smaller emission quotas. As the consumer of electricity and heat is often not as well organized as industry and the environmental lobby, governments will often find it easier to raise taxes for end-users.

Procedural management

Although the presiding officers retain authority over the negotiations as a whole, in practice, the main responsibility for the day-to-day procedural management of the negotiation process lies with the secretariat. Within the secretariat, this responsibility falls on the coordinators of the COP, SBSTA and SBI, and their professional staff, working with the conference services department on logistical matters. The secretariat supports the presiding officers in their exercise of process-oriented leadership, while taking the initiative to actively devise and propose ways of organizing the negotiations to promote agreement. The actions of the secretariat in this regard cannot be described as leadership, as its mandate forecloses, or at least heavily circumscribes, overt, independent action. The concept of organizational energy, however, captures well the way in which the secretariat injects strategic thought into the procedural management of the negotiations, but hiding behind the veil of...

Basic Conditions And Current Thinking Associated With Reconstituting Inoc And Reorganizing The Ministry Of

Versions of both measures have been reported out of the Council of Ministers to the Shura Council, an intermediate stopping point on the way to the Council of Representatives (i.e., parliament) for a formal vote.133 Nonofficial media sources reported the following month, though, that although a draft of the law reconstituting INOC had been voted out of the Council of Ministers, the draft concerning the reorganization of the Ministry of Oil had not made quite the same degree of progress.134 A September 2008 DoD follow-up on the March report noted that negotiations on both measures (as well as the framework law and revenue-sharing law) were continuing,135 and in early October 2008, the U.S. Department of State weekly status report on Iraq referred to neither the INOC nor the Oil Ministry measures,136 leaving the clear implication of serious negotiating roadblocks.137 As of early November 2008, the content of neither the INOC nor the Oil Ministry measures had been divulged, and...

Context of the Climate Policy Debate

The international climate change negotiations pursuant to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) serve as a lightning rod for the criticism of congressional and corporate climate change skeptics. These skeptics have skillfully shifted the domestic debate from the science of climate change to the contentious provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and effectively linked the two issues in the minds of many legislators. The global warming debate in the U.S. Congress has focused largely on the pros and cons of the protocol, which requires that developed countries reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below specified levels over a 5-year period beginning in 2008 but imposes no similar targets on developing countries. The lack of binding commitments by developing countries is a divisive issue for Congress. A comprehensive review of climate change negotiations to date is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, a brief review of some of the major scientific, legislative, and...

Conclusion The Implications Of The Fccc

Climate change had to be addressed through universal negotiations. This notion was universally accepted (by scientists, NGOs, industry, Northern states, Southern states, and IGOs) and it formed the boundaries for the climate change arena by constituting and defining appropriate levels of participation in this global environmental problem. No potential alternatives were even seriously considered. This chapter demonstrated that neither scientific information nor strategic behavior accounts for the acceptance and prevalence of universal participation. Instead, universal participation came to influence the climate change issue because it structured the political context in which climate change was addressed. Everyone knew what a global response to climate change should look like. Climate change had to be addressed through universal participation because the specific historical conditions, shaped by the ozone depletion negotiations, narrowed the possible definitions of the climate problem...

The WBGU budget approach Principles leeway and milestones

For the international climate negotiations, WBGU proposes a new approach that derives national emissions budgets by determining the total ecologically tolerable quantity of global CO2 emissions up to the year 2050, and apportioning this in line with fundamental principles of equity. The WBGU budget approach can greatly facilitate negotiations at the meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) in Copenhagen in December 2009. Based on a simple, transparent and equitable 'climate formula', countries' reduction commitments and the requisite financial transfers between industrialized and developing countries are established on a clear and comprehensible basis.

Regional and Subglobal Climate Blocs Lessons from Coalition Theory

The strategic choice of players who decide whether or not to form a coalition with other players and, if they do, with which specific players to cooperate has been the subject of recent research in game theory.1 Many of these recent studies are based on a noncooperative approach for which binding commitments are excluded. This approach is particularly suitable for analyzing the likely outcomes of future negotiations on climate change control because no supranational authority exists that can force countries to adopt policy measures to reduce their GHG emissions. Let us therefore examine the indications that the noncooper-ative theory of coalition formation provides for the analysis of climate negotiations. ment) is very close to the noncooperative business-as-usual activity (Barrett 2002). For the purpose of our analysis, the most important conclusion is as follows if countries are free to decide not only whether or not to sign a treaty but also which treaty (i.e., which coalition to...

The raw material miscellaneous documents

The basic documentary components for the climate change negotiations are the textual proposals put forward by parties and issued in miscellaneous - MISC -documents. These written inputs are submitted in response to requests from the subsidiary bodies or, less often, the COP. Because MISC documents simply reproduce parties' proposals verbatim, they are routinely used as an uncontroversial means of launching or advancing a negotiation process. Any new The Kyoto Protocol negotiations began with two rounds of party submissions, circulated in MISC documents. The first round of submissions, up to and including AGBM 3 in early 1996, consisted of 'comments' by parties. At AGBM 3, however, this request for submissions was upgraded to call for 'proposals', and at AGBM 4 in mid-1996 for 'concrete proposals', thereby encouraging parties to propose more specific draft text in legal language, rather than a vague expos of ideas. The six-month deadline for the circulation of the formal negotiating...

Okanogan County Memorandum of Understanding

Under the ESA, mechanisms for protection against take liability are not provided for until after an HCP is negotiated and legally in effect. Negotiations related to HCPs can and often do take years to complete, while in the interim liability for the taking of endangered species continues in force. Whereas fish screening and passage issues can often be addressed through engineered designs that can usually be implemented in a relatively short period of time, addressing take caused by inadequate flows frequently requires substantial study and complicated, long-term multi-party policy negotiations. The MOU in the Okanogan County scenario was intended to provide some assurances to local water districts, including an understanding about prosecutorial discretion in certain circumstances while an HCP was being negotiated.

Temporal Complexity and Dynamic Adaptation

Perhaps the most vexing form of complexity confronting climate policy is temporal Things change over time. The environment changes, so climate change may turn out to be more or less serious (or different in kind) than we now envision. The economy changes in ways that may ease or exacerbate abatement costs. Temporal complexity implies two challenges optimally allocating abatement efforts over time and adapting climate policy as conditions and knowledge evolve. Compared with causal and spatial complexity, temporal complexity has received the least attention in the actual climate change treaty negotiations.

The Role of the ETS in the Post Kyoto Process

The discussion about the options for international climate policy after 2012, the so-called post-Kyoto process, is strongly influenced by the negative experiences of the Kyoto process to date. The cap-and-trade approach has not been accepted by important countries like the United States. The reduction requirements for the Annex B countries are so weak that they cannot be used as an example for future negotiations if the objectives of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) namely, the avoidance of dangerous climate change are to be met in the twenty-first century. The developing world is hardly included in the reduction efforts, although some countries like China and India are already large emitters of greenhouse gases and are doing so at an increasing rate. China will surpass the CO2 emissions of the United States in the next few decades.

Territoriality Inequality and CO Emissions

The human influence on the global climate raises a range of ethical considerations. For example, how much change in climate-related parameters should be tolerated Is the lack of scientific certainty a legitimate reason for inaction Does cost-benefit analysis provide a fair grounding for decisions on climate policy Do developed countries have special responsibilities to act before the poorer nations (Brown, 2001) The climate negotiations have, in particular, brought to the fore debates on distributive justice - for example, about