Natural Resources

George B Frisvold and Kyle J Emerick Conclusions and policy implications

Rural-urban water transfers in developing countries have received increasing attention from economists and other social scientists Bauer 2004 Biswas 2006 Galaz 2004 Hearne 2004 Merrett 2003 Michel 2002 Mumme and Lybecker 2006 Riaz 2002 Rosegrant and Schleyer 1996 . Demand for large-scale transfers will probably increase with the rise of megacities large urban agglomerations in many developing countries Biswas 2006 Varis 2006 . The issues highlighted in the stylized theoretical and numerical...

References

Adams, J., Crews, D., and Cummings, R. 2004 The sale and leasing of water rights in the western United States an update to mid-2003, Water Policy Working Paper 2004-004. Bauer, C.J. 2004 Results of Chilean water markets empirical research since 1990, Water Resources Research, 40 W09S06, doi 10.1029 2003WR002838. Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., and Wolinsky, A. 1986 The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling, RAND Journal of Economics, 17 176-88. Biswas, A.K. 2006 Water management for major...

Contributors

Jiro Akita is Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University. He is currently Vice-Chair of the Department of Economics. His research area is international finance, macroeconomics, and environmental economics. His translated book on environmental economics has become one of the major references in Japan. Jos Albiac is Researcher at the Department of Agricultural Economics, Agrifood Research and Technology Center Government of Aragon, Spain . His...

What makes water resources a natural candidate for cooperative game theory applications

Indeed this is a question that intrigues many scholars involved in this field. First, water-related conflicts involve usually a small number of stakeholders (players) that are interrelated to each other. Therefore, there is a greater scope for strategic behavior among players in water-related conflicts. Second, the level of externalities associated with water utilization is a big incentive to cooperate. Externalities include (a) the zero-sum (or constant-sum) outcomes of unilateral use of the...

Allocation regime options

Based on historical surface water allocation practices and water conflicts in the basin, this chapter endeavors to examine three options of water allocation regimes commonly used. Option 1 Water allocation through unregulated withdrawals. Under such a regime, each region withdraws water freely according to its needs. The actual water withdrawal depends mainly on its diversion capacity and the costs of increasing diversion capacity. Option 2 Water allocation through prior agreed water quotas....

A numerical illustration

This section illustrates the analyses conducted in the previous section using a numerical example inspired by project 0455, mentioned in section 15.2.3. The project concerns the food sector, for which there exists some evidence in support of the Cournot competition model, at least in the international market. Furthermore, the project employs baseline methodology AM0008, which makes reference to both ex ante and ex post baseline emission levels. The project involves conversion from oil to...

Review of water allocation studies

A literature review of previous modeling studies of water allocation issues and water conflict management indicates that the approaches for water allocation modeling fall into four broad categories (a) system simulation (b) optimum allocation based on optimization theory or economics theory (c) optimum allocation based on eco-economics theory and (d) optimum allocation based on institutional economics theory or game theory. The system simulation approach, category (a), is the earliest in...

Repetition of the conflict by a large population

It is necessary to model the Tepoztlan organization process using adequate dynamics. As explained in section 14.2, the emergence of the CUT was a gradual process. Many conflicts similar to the organization game took place daily among different groups of Tepoztecos in which the decision to act individually or in an organized way was involved. Day by day such conflicts arose in one or another neighborhood, in the fields, at the market, in schools, or in other settings. The emergence of the CUT...

Nature of traditional pastoralist systems

Sub-Saharan Africa's pastoralist systems are characterized by three key features mobility, shared use of forage and water resources, and the imprecise nature of the institutional rules governing common resource use and the underlying property rights. These institutional features are responses to the nature of the ecological system pastoralists face. Average rainfall is low in sub-Saharan Africa, and its variability is high. As a result, forage is patchy , so that productivity can vary...

Kyoto Protocol and the CDM

The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997 and came into effect in February 2005. More than 30 developed countries and transition economy countries have agreed to assume the treaty obligation to control their greenhouse gas emissions below their respective specified levels during the period from 2008 through 2012. Those countries are referred to as Annex I Parties (countries) because they are listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. On the other hand, those...

Water allocation issues in the Kat basin

Water sources in the Kat basin are currently almost exclusively from surface water. Some groundwater developments are foreseen in the near future and this could increase water availability in the basin by nearly 10 percent (DWAF 2001).5 As mentioned above, decisions about water allocation strategies will become the responsibility of the recently established Water Figure 5.1 Kat basin and stylized subbasins in the role-playing game (Source Left panel is based on map prepared by Alistair McMaster...

Adour River negotiations

The analysis in this chapter is based on a specific negotiation process regarding water allocation, water storage capacity, and water prices for users in the Adour catchment area in southwestern France. This example provides an excellent case study for analysis using the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model, because a substantial amount of information about the context of the negotiations is available. This information includes details about the hydrology of the river, the use of the...

Conceptual framework Rausser Simon multilateral bargaining model

The noncooperative multilateral bargaining model developed in Rausser and Simon 1999 is designed to model the complex structure of multiplayer, multi-issue negotiations. It is a computational model that can be calibrated to the parameters of a specific bargaining problem, including the structure of the bargaining process itself. In contrast to most multilateral bargaining models in the literature, its solution is particularly sensitive to bargaining efforts made at the last minute before...

Mathematical representation of water allocation

Before discussing the mathematical model for water allocation analysis, it is important to clearly define rational water allocation. While there are different descriptions in the literature, Chen and Wang (1996) provided a very clear definition, that is, rational water allocation refers to distribution and dispatching of water resources among different water users, in a river basin or hydraulic unit, following the principles of efficiency, fairness, and sustain-ability, through various...