The second edition of this book represents a total overhaul and complete revision of the first. Only Chapters 2, 3, and 8 bear any resemblance to text found in the earlier edition; the other chapters were written in recent years. Although this is essentially a new book, many of the acknowledgments remain the same. I wrote the second edition as I did the first while at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. There is little in this essay that did not arise out of discussion with my colleagues at the Institute and the School, or from some thought suggested by their work, or in response to their sympathetic criticism, or to the ideas they offered me. No research center other than the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, as far as I know, provides a similar opportunity for philosophers to pursue politically informed conceptual analysis on a sustained basis. Each page of this book acknowledges implicitly, as I do explicitly here, the help I received from my colleagues at the Institute over the years - editors Claudia Mills, Arthur Evenchik, and Verna Gehring and researchers (past and present) David Crocker, Robert Fullinwider, William Galston, Peter Levine, Xiaorong Li, Judith Lichtenberg, David Luban, Douglas MacLean, Henry Shue, Robert Wachbroit, and David Wasserman. I am particularly grateful to two colleagues at the School of Public Policy, with offices neighboring mine on the same floor, Robert H. Nelson and Herman E. Daly, for their patience, kindness, and direction. Bob Nelson labored over an earlier draft to alert me to many errors I would have otherwise committed, and he suggested many arguments I could not have otherwise made. I should also like to thank the Institute administrator, Carroll Linkins, and our graduate assistant, Jillien Dube, who dealt cheerfully and patiently with the secretarial problems I created in writing and revising this manuscript.
I am deeply grateful to good friends outside the Institute, especially for the direction of Paul Thompson, who provided needed advice on the whole manuscript, and to Bryan Norton and Baird Callicott for help on particular chapters. I received essential encouragement from friends including Philip Bobbitt, Peter Jutro, and Clifford Russell. Terry Moore, who at Cambridge edited the first edition of this book, initiated the second. Like many others, I miss him; I am also grateful to Beatrice Rehl for taking up his work.
The National Science Foundation, especially the Ethics and Values Studies program, headed by Rachelle Hollander, over the years has supported my research. Working within a tiny budget, Dr. Hollander has helped to create the field of ethical analysis of science and technology; she is in large measure responsible for its development. All of us who work in this interdisciplinary area know how important her energetic advice and guidance have been; the Ethics and Values Studies program exemplifies the very best way the government may support scholarship. I should also like gratefully to acknowledge additional support I have received from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Maryland Sea Grant Program, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes of Health (program in the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project), and the Pew Charitable Trusts. The views expressed in the book are those of the author only, however, not necessarily those of any other person or any agency.
I wish to thank my wife, Kendra, and children, Jared and Amelia, for giving me the energy I needed to complete this book. They provide the reason and the reward for writing; they teach me "not from the positions of philosophers but from the fabric of nature."
In writing this book I have borrowed, built on, revised, or otherwise worked from several essays published previously. A shorter version of Chapter 1 appeared in Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 27 (Winter/Spring 2007): 2-7. Chapter 2 borrows from the Arizona Law Review 23 (1981): 1281-1298; Chapter 3 draws upon "We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law," Environmental Law 12 (1982): 283-315; Chapter 4 takes passages from an article that appeared in Ethics 96 (1986): 301-316 and includes material from "An Aggregate Measure of What? A Reply to Zerbe, Bauman, and Finkle," Ecological Economics 60 (1) (November 2006): 913; Chapter 5 draws largely on two publications: "On the Economic Value of Nature's Services," Environmental Values 17 (1) (February 2008); and "Locke Was Right: Nature Has Little Economic Value," Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 25 (3) (Summer 2005): 2-11. Chapter 6 revises "Do We Consume Too Much?" The Atlantic Monthly 279 (6) (June 1997): 80-96; an earlier version of Chapter 7 appeared as "On the Compatibility of a Conservation Ethic with Biological Science," Conservation Biology 21 (2) (April 2007): 337-345; Chapter 8 relies on material that appeared in "On Preserving the Natural Environment," Yale Law Journal 84 (1974): 205-267; and Chapter 9 contains material from "Settling America or The Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics," Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & Environmental Law 12 (2) (1992): 351-418. A short version of Chapter 10 appeared in Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 27 (Summer/Fall 2007): 2-9.1 am grateful to the editors of these journals for permission to build on these essays.
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