writing of a botched soil conservation program and the proposed remedy x of 'more education,' he replies: 'The net result (my emphasis) is that we b have more education and less soil.'14 Leopold is opposed to versions of 0
o consequentialism that try to reduce the value of nature to economic self-
^ interest of humans; but this is not to be confused with consequentialism
¡2 in general. He was concerned about developing an ecological awareness, o x but the fundamental principle of the land ethic is 'A thing is right when "o it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does otherwise.'15 Clearly, that an action or a a thing 'tends to preserve' is a causal property, not a type of motivation "5 or consciousness from which the action originates. Therefore, the land "o ethic is consequentialist.
Callicott asks 'Is the land ethic prudential or deontological? In other words, Is the land ethic a matter of enlightened (collective, human) self-interest or does it genuinely admit non-human natural entities and nature as a whole to true moral standing?' But the question, as he defines it, is not a choice between prudential (suggesting utilitarian) and deontological (the anti-consequentialist position that a right action is one motivated by a proper sense of duty). The choice, as he poses it, is more between an anthropocentric or extended moral community. Clearly, the land ethic is a rejection of anthropocentrism. But a rejection of anthropocentrism does not imply a rejection of consequentialism. Anthropocentrism is a theory of value. Consequentialism is a theory of the factors relevant to an action being right or wrong. Therefore, Callicott has not proven, as he claims, 'that the land ethic is deontological (or duty oriented) rather than prudential.'16 The land ethic, aside from its implications in regard to self-realisation, is a thoroughly consequentialistic (and, therefore, not a deontological) theory.
Actual consequentialism as a theoretical basis for issues in the preservation and restoration of the environment gives us one piece of the environmental ethics theory puzzle. Some might find it a perplexing conclusion, since the main thrust of recent work in environmental ethics theory has been extending to non-humans rights and interests traditionally reserved for humans. The key is seeing that environmental ethics confronts two logically separate questions - self-realisation and the preservation and restoration of the environment. The latter question most reasonably is cast in a consequentialist framework.
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