beneficial effects. Many environmental actions are seen as being in the ^ self-interest of citizens, such as installing energy-efficient light bulbs p
and solar panels in households or utilizing other energy conservation g measures. The adoption of similar measures by companies, and applied a to the whole life cycle of their products and services, is part and parcel of ecological modernization. Yet many of these actions do not lead to ■¡H changes in understanding. Citizens may adopt energy conservation tech--g niques simply as a way of reducing their fuel bills rather than out of a S concern for the environment, and may not even be aware of the causes £ and far-flung effects of climate change. Likewise businesses may adopt "5 life-cycle analysis and promote recycling of their products but do so to 'm cut costs and improve profitability. Moreover, these measures do not 15 necessarily affect other activities by citizens or corporations unless im-m mediate interests are at stake. Environmental action seeks to use levers that discourage particular actions while encouraging others, but less attention is paid to whether citizens understand the reasons for acting responsibly. We need to challenge both philosophy-centred and politics-centred approaches in favour of a strategic orientation that focuses on how ethical and political elements are articulated in 'modes of citizenship', whether these are civil, political, social or ecological (Roche 1992; Christoff 1996; Smith 1998), and transformed into moments where these conceptions have the temporary appearance of permanence, generating 'subject positions' in which individuals can invest their identities. Rather than treating citizenship as an abstract conceptual device, we argue that it is better understood as an ethico-political space where the right, the good and the virtuous are acknowledged as provisional, open to contestation and subject to deliberation.
Opinion research has often indicated that individuals have broad commitments to addressing climate change, the safe storage and disposal of hazardous wastes, to promoting renewable energy sources, and to reducing pollution levels. At the same time, studies of behaviour often do not demonstrate how attitudes generate activities that lead to environmentally responsible actions, especially when the means of resolving a problem (waste incinerators, wind farms, nuclear waste storage facilities, highway construction projects to reroute traffic from population centres, or indirect impacts such as the fall in employment opportunities) are perceived as having an adverse effect on a particular community generating localized NIMBY ('not in my backyard') responses. Also, they do not account for the gaps between knowledge and understanding of the processes of climate change and personal decisions to invest in motor vehicle transportation over long distances between home and work or in holiday travel that requires long-haul flights to different parts of the world. Indeed, environmental awareness is often associated with the desire to be closer to nature, to have access to green spaces and experience environments that are in many cases unlike the ones with which we are familiar. Parents move their families from urban areas to suburban or rural ones in the desire to have a better environment for their children to grow up in, consequently having to commute long distances to work in order to maintain their 'nouveau-environmental' lifestyles.
In many developed societies, researchers and governments often equate the problem of a lack of civic engagement on environmental issues simply with a lack of awareness of environmental issues (Barr 2003), and point out that knowing the facts often leads to attitudinal change and, in turn, in a linear way, to more responsible behaviour. Certainly, the possession of practical knowledge (such as 'knowledge of' vegetable gardening and animal husbandry in the slow food movement) provides a basis for responsible action, and this can be a significant factor, as opposed to 'knowledge about' (James 1890), i.e. general abstract knowledge of climate change or the effects of toxic chemicals. This ignores two important issues, however: that a range of other factors may be involved; and that citizens accept, modify and reinterpret the information provided by scientists, governments, NGOs and other sources, in the everyday discourses through which they make sense of the world (Burningham and O'Brien 1994). Rather than just focus on the search for empirical regularities between attitudes and behaviour, it is crucial to examine the intentions of actors and the tacit knowledge or the taken-for-granted assumptions of citizens. In addition, psychological approaches tend to consider actors in individualistic terms rather than as citizens that may be individuals, corporations, NGOs, unions or movements. All of these 'citizens' should not be viewed as solely operating in the private sphere but also seen as making interventions in the public sphere, participating in partnerships with political authorities while also simultaneously engaging in self-regulation. The construction of ecological citizens is better seen as involving new ways of producing the meaning of entitlements and obligations, whereby values and action inform one another in culturally specific ways but are also shaped by open and tolerant discussion that does not ignore the passions and commitments involved in environmental activism. In more concrete terms, the precise configuration of entitlements and obligations (and whether these should be reciprocal) will be subject to negotiation. And in the strategic context of ethico-political discourses, subject positions provide 3 the means through which politics is lived. The return to virtues in ethical h
and political discussions on the environment (Barry 1999; Dobson 2003) d offers interesting ways of rethinking the meaning of obligation, where p
the cultivation of the character of the self acts as a route for the regard g of others. This chapter argues, however, that we should not treat one q
kind of virtue - compassion, courage, practical wisdom or justice - as Q
the basis of all other virtues. There are plenty to choose from that are ■¡H directly relevant to environmental problems.
-g Andrew Dobson (2003) draws on Vandana Shiva (1992) to argue that S the constitutional asymmetries should be factored into globalization pro-£ cesses at the start, and not added to a picture of a more interconnected "5 world developed by theorists of cosmopolitanism. The effects of social 'm and economic changes in advanced countries are global, but this does 15 not necessarily mean that the processes work both ways. In addition, the m focus on networks and flows tends to ignore the differential power of the actors in negotiations and bargaining at the international level - the experience of time-space compression is enjoyed by those who have the privilege of belonging to the gated communities of industrial societies (the globalizers) rather than those on the outside (the globalized). These asymmetries within current generations and the lack of reciprocity are analogous to those identified in debates on obligations to future generations (Barry 1978).
Dobson suggests that some kinds of cosmopolitanism offer the hope of resistance to the asymmetrical tendencies of actual globalization and heralds the possibility of constructing political communities beyond the nation-state that can be achieved through social bonding through a commitment to open dialogue (with the creation of institutional conditions for realizing this), so that all participants are recognized and can voice their concerns. This approach focuses on the human community, assumes that impartiality is the modus operandi, and posits that greater or more intense dialogue is the democratic objective. Bonding develops the sense of belonging to the human community and the duties this entails. We are obliged to act with regard to the needs of strangers out of compassion and charity - the 'good Samaritan' principle of global citizenship. For Dobson, this not only leaves obligations hanging (as charity can be withdrawn or even reproduce the vulnerability of the recipient), but it lacks a specific mechanism for addressing environmental harms, even if transnational dialogue can help crystallize the duty of protecting the vulnerable. What Dobson has in mind is a focus on specific communities of obligation, in other words obligation spaces with their own injustices and coerced dialogues. He argues that partiality is crucial for effective strategies to achieve more justice, so the objective should be to change the reasons for acting.
Other forms of cosmopolitanism have influenced Dobson's approach, such as the stress on the first virtue of more justice in response to harm (in addition to the commitment to open and uncoerced dialogue). Drawing on Simon Caney (2001), Dobson highlights how a theory of distribution can be defended by reference to a theory of moral personality, whereby entitlements to an equal share can be established prior to inhabiting culture, national identity or ethnicity. Such entitlements are viewed as being grounded in human autonomy or the possession of rights, the selection of which lends plausibility to his contention that this is 'a specifically political type of obligation as opposed to a more broadly moral type' (Dobson 2003: 29). This reasoning is portrayed as a more convincing basis for thinking through citizenship beyond the state, dealing in the currency of justice rather than compassion, but this approach also still lacks a clear idea of the reasons why we should act. He also argues that being obliged to do justice, to act in a way because it is binding rather than just bonding, is, for Dobson, a political rather than a moral obligation. Justice is thus portrayed as a binding relationship between equals rather than the one-way and revocable consequence of humanitarian obligations. Recognizing that morals and politics operate together in environmental activism does not mean, however, that this is mixing them up. Different values operate in different contexts and environmental movements and NGO activism can provide convincing explanations of environmental responsibility through appeals to ties that bond as well as bind. Bonding operates in many ways. It includes recognizing that human strangers deserve environmental quality and social justice combined as well as recognizing that we have the capacity to bond with other species and the physical environment they experience.
Dobson makes a distinction between moral obligations as a non-reciprocal commitment to others and political obligations as grounded in binding relationships based on some degree of parity, as well as between specifically political obligations and general moral obligations, with politics and morality also distinct in terms of scope. By grounding entitlements in autonomy and the possession of rights, this already assumes some understanding of rationality or species membership. The line drawn between politics and morality is asserted but not substantiated, suggesting that politics is ethics-free. Analytic distinctions clarify the precise kinds of ethical and political judgements, but assuming that they can be separated in substantive terms within everyday life is misleading. Passions and emotional attachment have always been and 3 will always remain a key feature of environmental action. It is through h
passion that movements mobilize, it is through compassion that activ- d ists support each other even before they become friends, it is through p
culturally specific virtues that vary from place to place and it is because g they care that they endure the defeats and celebrate the successes. Trust a
and commitment are also central to environmental action and processes of accountability. That's why we say 'our word is our bond' and not 'our ■¡H bind'. We agree that the ties that bind are an important corollary and -g essential in forming obligations into more established duties, but we S should not exclude human bonding.
This also leads us back to the importance of the cultivation of char-"5 acteristics that are virtuous. When we live in a 'community', we are 'iñ simultaneously human and a citizen - what matters then is how these 15 are defined and how they are articulated in the concrete situations of m 'ineradicable antagonism' (Mouffe 2000, 2005; Smith 2005). Citizenly 'subject positions' are temporary respites in ongoing confrontations over the meaning of citizenship, and the virtues each subject position mobilizes are provisional. In agonistic democracy, struggles are staged around diverse conceptions of citizenship with each proposing its interpretation of the common good, right courses of action and virtues that should be cultivated. Ecological citizenship is just one way of engaging in 'the political'. The key task is to identify the potential and limits of subject positions that feature in environmental discourses following the postulate of adequacy (that the second-order constructs of social and natural scientists should draw from the first-order constructs of lived experience, and that the knowledge produced should be intelligible to those people in the context of the environments studied).
Artificially separating morals and politics smacks of the attachment to detachment, a key feature of disciplinary knowledge in Western societies (Smith 2000) that ignores the historical and social rootedness of environmental knowledge. To separate the community of citizens from the community of humanity (Dobson 2003: 27), or alternatively separating the currencies of justice and compassion, also potentially drives a wedge between values and action as well as obscuring the connections between environmental and social justice.
This treatment of the virtue of justice is comparable to the unification of virtues developed in Christian accounts privileging compassion or charity (along with faith and hope) over the classical virtues of courage, practical wisdom (prudence), justice and temperance. This kind of unification process is questionable. Instead, we need a more flexible framework that recognizes the codependence of and overlaps between virtues. Being compassionate depends on having courage, while beingjust depends on temperance - restraining materialistic appetites - as implied in Dobson's endorsement of ecological footprint analysis. In place of these thin and non-material cosmopolitan accounts of 'the ties that bind', he proposes post-cosmopolitanism, whereby the ties are materially (re-) produced in daily life within an unequal and asymmetrically globalizing context. As a consequence of globalization, relations once considered a matter of compassion are increasingly citizen relations. The provision of 'aid' in response to natural hazards should be seen not as benevolent acts of charity but compensatory justice, for the harm inflicted by industrial societies on others is a result of human-induced climate change, altering the nature and the source of obligation.
The arguments above alert us to the difference between obligations and duties as well as identifying the informal kinds of binding and bonding through which obligations are sustained. This approach avoids privileging one virtue, such as justice or compassion, over the range of different virtues (often combined) which may be relevant in each manifestation of citizenship (including environmental and ecological varieties). Practical wisdom (or prudence) is more compatible with the precautionary principle and notions of environmental stewardship than justice. Potential exists in using the virtues of temperance, kindness, generosity, humility, simplicity, gentleness, tolerance, forgiveness, self-sacrifice and even sadness (being resigned to one's fate). The list could be longer, but a brief scan of these should immediately demonstrate that they may or may not be articulated in terms of Dobson's case for justice as fair shares of ecological space. The key point is that notions of virtue are not simply imposed, they are cultivated as deliberate attempts to live up to regard for others (whether they are our adversaries or our friends). Fulfilling obligations is also an honourable act of self-regard, completing one's side of an agreement, living up to a mission, feeling good about one's reputation, being a 'good human being' or leading a flourishing life. There will be dilemmas when adjudicating upon the relative importance of one species compared to another (including the human species), but then ethical dilemmas are not absent from other approaches and we should not anticipate their absence here. We started out by stressing that citizens often articulate ethical and political ideas in hybridized and analytically inconsistent ways, so by focusing on concrete manifestations of 'the virtuous', 'the good' or 'the right' - along with the use of epistemological and aesthetic judgements - we can begin to understand how culturally specific antagonisms affect environmental debate and encourage us to treat other political subjects as adversaries 3
we can respect rather than as enemies to confront. h
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Do we really want the one thing that gives us its resources unconditionally to suffer even more than it is suffering now? Nature, is a part of our being from the earliest human days. We respect Nature and it gives us its bounty, but in the recent past greedy money hungry corporations have made us all so destructive, so wasteful.