The purpose of this chapter is to look at compliance measures used in other international environmental regimes to see if there are any lessons that might be applied in the context of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Institutions examined in this context are the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) regime, the ozone layer regime based on the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, and the internal climate policy of the European Union (EU). There are clearly functional similarities and differences between these three institutions and the climate change regime from which interesting lessons may be learned.

Roughly speaking, each of these three institutional frameworks deals with 'atmospheric' problems (the EU even deals specifically with climate change). Hence, there should be some common challenges related to the measuring and reporting of emissions. With regard to the various North-South compliance challenges, the ozone regime has valuable experience in handling reporting deficiencies and non-compliance within a global environmental policy context. Regarding the handling of the special compliance challenges faced by countries with economies in transition, both the ozone regime and CLRTAP have experience in handling this 'Eastern' dimension. Both these regimes also have several years of experience with the functioning of implementation committees. In the case of ozone, this experience is over a decade long. Finally, in terms of response and enforcement, the EU should offer interesting lessons as a supranational enforcement institution, one that is also starting to address the specific problem of climate change. Although the EU's membership is limited, its countries nevertheless represent a wide range of interests and capacities when it comes to implementation of climate policy. Thus the EU's climate policy can be seen as a microcosm of the Kyoto Protocol, complete with many of the same challenges.

This chapter will describe the evolution of verification, review and response mechanisms within these different institutional contexts, and assess:

1 the major forces that have driven this evolution, including the balance between internal needs and external learning;

2 the extent to which these various mechanisms have actually been used, and their roles in furthering compliance within the regimes in question; and

3 the relevance of lessons learned in these other institutional contexts for the climate regime.

As further elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, the Marrakesh Accords adopted in November 2001 put the main finishing touches on the Kyoto Protocol's compliance regime, which, according to the ENDS Report, is a 'more far reaching non-compliance procedure than in any existing environmental treaty'.2 The main elements of the Protocol's climate procedure that this chapter will address, in seeking lessons from other contexts that may be of value, are verification, review and response. In the area of verification, national reporting on emissions inventories and other information relating to compliance with commitments is the central ingredient (see primarily Articles 7 and 8 in the Protocol).3 Here, a central challenge is to ensure on-time and accurate reporting from states with weak administrative capacities.

Second, with regard to review, an interesting element of the Protocol's compliance procedure is the establishment of Expert Review Teams, which are to 'provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol' and report the results back to the Conference of the Parties (COP) (Article 8.3). A key question to be addressed here is whether there is any precedent for this form of arrangement in the three other institutions scrutinized in this chapter. Another striking feature in the institutional structure of the Kyoto Protocol is the establishment of a Compliance Committee, composed of two branches: a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch. A challenge here will be to ensure smooth communication and cooperation between these two branches so that the Compliance Committee functions effectively. The precise and uncontested identification of non-compliers will be the central compliance challenge within the regime, as experienced observers have noted.4 Such identification is of course a prerequisite for a meaningful operation of the response system.

Third, in the area of response, as can be recalled, Marrakesh negotiators were applauded for agreeing that parties not in compliance with their commitments in the first commitment period, which runs from 2008-12, would have to deduct 1.3 tonnes from their second commitment period assigned amount for every tonne of gas they emitted in excess of their agreed targets in the first commitment period. One critical question to ask in this context is whether there are any precedents for such enforcement procedures under other environmental regimes, and if so, what the experiences with these procedures have been.

Having introduced the climate policy issues around which lessons from the three institutions examined could be drawn, it must be emphasized that there are significant differences and similarities between the ozone layer regime, the CLRTAP regime and the EU climate policy - the three institutions singled out for comparison - and the international climate change regime. Procedures and practice under each regime, with regard to verification, review and response have been shaped both by he nature of the underlying environmental and cooperative problems at hand and the nature of the international political response emerging to these problems.5 The following section briefly describes the cooperative contexts of the three institutions and some important ways in which they differ from the global climate change context.

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